The Consistency of Plantinga’s Argument Against Naturalism

Philo 7 (1):122-125 (2004)
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Abstract

Matthew Tedesco has argued that Alvin Plantinga’s argument that belief in naturalistic evolution is self-defeating entails, according to a parallel argument, that theistic belief is self-defeating for the same reasons. I defend Plantinga against this charge by arguing that the parallel argument is unsound.

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10983570

DOI

10.5840/philo20047110

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Eric Vogelstein
Duquesne University

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