Abstract
In the discussion between realism and anti-realism, the causal theory of reference plays a central role. As a version of metaphysical realism, causal realism maintains that language is hooked upon the world by means of causal chains that account for the relation between language and extra-linguistic reality, a thesis denied by antirealism in its various forms. The paper investigates these criticisms which are both logical and epistemological, taking as an example H. Putnam's views on these matters. It is argued that the anti-realist criticisms against the causal theory of reference may at least in part be misdirected, since they use a concept of causality that is of a qualitatively different nature from the one used in realist theories. Finally, it is shown how the main tenets of metaphysical realism can be reformulated so as to accomodate for several more general—but related—criticisms having to do with its ontological and epistemological presuppositions