Abstract

This dissertation responds to a current trend in moral education that advocates fostering empathy in students. Individual scholarly accounts falsely generate the impression of consensus on the nature of empathy, the process of empathy, and empathy's moral value. Viewed as a whole, these accounts narrate a far more complex story. Drawing heavily from moral philosophy and moral psychology, I explore the nature and processes of empathic phenomena and their connections to morality. I argue that empathy's connection to morality is far more complex than generally assumed and that in order to cultivate empathy in schools for the purposes of moral education, educators must pay close attention to these complexities. To neglect them is to endanger the very ties between empathy and morality. ;Tracing the history of the concept of empathy reveals that theorists have not been describing a single phenomenon. They have been examining a number of distinct but related "empathies." A question arises, "which conception are we calling for in moral education?" or, better yet, "which of these conceptions should we be calling for?" The remainder of the dissertation examines dimensions of empathic phenomena that can be seen as salient for morality and for educators. Extended analysis on these topics suggests that some dimensions are more securely tied to morality than others. First, empathic phenomena with strong connections to morality possess evaluative as well as emotional dimensions. Second, exploring the philosophical problem of other peoples' minds suggests that empathizing with actual others serves to connect empathy more securely with morality. Third, an empathizer's epistemic authority can be improved through acts of dialogic confirmation. Finally, empathy is part of a cultural and historical dynamic and is influenced by a person's past experiences. Educators must negotiate these issues in order to cultivate an empathy securely connected to morality. I conclude by suggesting some practical means to do this in schools