The limits of neuropsychological models of consciousness

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 18 (4):702-703 (1995)
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Abstract

This commentary elaborates on Gray's conclusion that his neurophysiological model of consciousness might explain how consciousness arises from the brain, but does not address how consciousness evolved, affects behaviour or confers survival value. The commentary argues that such limitations apply to all neurophysiological or other third-person perspective models. To approach such questions the first-person nature of consciousness needs to be taken seriously in combination with third-person models of the brain.

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Max Velmans
Goldsmiths College, University of London

Citations of this work

Consciousness during dreams.PierCarla Cicogna & Marino Bosinelli - 2001 - Consciousness and Cognition 10 (1):26-41.
Consciousness and the "causal paradox".Max Velmans - 1996 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542.

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References found in this work

Vision.David Marr - 1982 - W. H. Freeman.
The Structure of Scientific Revolutions.Thomas S. Kuhn - 1962 - Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press. Edited by Ian Hacking.
Intentionality: An Essay in the Philosophy of Mind.John R. Searle - 1983 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
The Principles of Psychology.William James - 1890 - London, England: Dover Publications.

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