Consciousness and the "causal paradox"

Behavioral and Brain Sciences 19 (3):538-542 (1996)
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Abstract

Viewed from a first-person perspective consciousness appears to be necessary for complex, novel human activity - but viewed from a third-person perspective consciousness appears to play no role in the activity of brains, producing a "causal paradox". To resolve this paradox one needs to distinguish consciousness of processing from consciousness accompanying processing or causing processing. Accounts of consciousness/brain causal interactions switch between first- and third-person perspectives. However, epistemically, the differences between first- and third-person access are fundamental. First- and third-person accounts are complementary and mutually irreducible.

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Max Velmans
Goldsmiths College, University of London

Citations of this work

How could conscious experiences affect brains?Max Velmans - 2002 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 9 (11):3-29.
Reflexive monism.Max Velmans - 2008 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 15 (2):5-50.
The Co-Evolution of Matter and Consciousness.Max Velmans - 2007 - Synthesis Philosophica 22 (2):273-282.
Intentionality, Conceptual Content, and Emotions.Léo Peruzzo Júnior - 2019 - Revista de Filosofia Aurora 31 (54).

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References found in this work

Facing up to the problem of consciousness.David Chalmers - 1995 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 2 (3):200-19.
Is human information processing conscious?Max Velmans - 1991 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 14 (4):651-69.
Characteristics of dissociable human learning systems.David R. Shanks & Mark F. St John - 1994 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 17 (3):367-447.
Consciousness, causality and complementarity.Max Velmans - 1993 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 16 (2):404-416.

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