The Argument from Abomination

Erkenntnis 78 (5):1185-1196 (2013)
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Abstract

The conclusive reasons view of knowledge entails the “abominable conjunction” that I know that I have hands but I do not know that I am not a brain in a vat. The argument from abomination takes this as a reason to reject the view. This paper aims to buttress the argument from abomination by adding a new sort to this list: the logical abominations. These include: “I know that argument is sound and that sound arguments have true conclusions but I don’t know whether the conclusion of that argument is true”. Two standard replies to the argument from abomination are raised. It is argued that the logical abominations open new holes in both

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Michael Veber
East Carolina University

Citations of this work

Biased Knowers, Biased Reasons, and Biased Philosophers.Michael Veber - forthcoming - International Journal for the Study of Skepticism:1-11.
I Know I am Not Gettiered.Michael Veber - 2013 - Analytic Philosophy 54 (4):401-420.

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References found in this work

Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.
Knowledge and lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2004 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Solving the skeptical problem.Keith DeRose - 1995 - Philosophical Review 104 (1):1-52.
Knowledge and Lotteries.John Hawthorne - 2005 - Philosophical Quarterly 55 (219):353-356.
Philosophical Explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Mind 93 (371):450-455.

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