Humean and anti-Humean internalism about moral judgements

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 65 (1):26-49 (2002)
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Abstract

Motivational internalism about moral judgments is the plausible view that accepting a moral judgment is necessarily connected to motivation motivation. However, it conflicts with the Humean theory that motives must be constituted by desires. Simple versions of internalism run into problems with people who do not desire to do what they believe right. This has long been urged by David Brink. Hence, many internalists have adopted more subtle defeasible views, on which only rational agents will have a desire to act. I will argue that more complex versions run into problems with self-effacing values of the sort Parfit highlights in another context. Such values can only be attained indirectly. After proposing a general account of motivation suited to the internalist thesis, I argue that Anti-Humeanism is better suited to accommodating the internalist insight

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Citations of this work

Motivational Internalism.Christian Basil Miller - 2008 - Philosophical Studies 139 (2):233-255.
Motivation in Agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.
A Challenge for Humean Externalism.Steven Swartzer - 2018 - Philosophical Studies 175 (1):23-44.
The Challenge of Amoralism.Voin Milevski - 2018 - Ratio 31 (2):252-266.

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References found in this work

Reasons and Persons.Derek Parfit - 1984 - Oxford University Press.
The Possibility of Altruism.Thomas Nagel - 1970 - Oxford Clarendon Press.

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