Abstract

The main argument of this paper is concerned with a formal recognition of difference, namely recognition of the value of a culture for the other. Axel Honneth makes a distinction between three types of recognition: love, respect and social esteem. Recognition of cultural difference is situated in the third sphere. There are two problems with his proposals. In the first place he constructs appreciation for cultural difference as a moral imperative in the form of 'solidarity'. When it comes to normative demands in the third sphere of recognition, our alternative is hermeneutic openness. In the second place, formal respect in Honneth's scheme is solely the universal recognition of personal autonomy and its preconditions. But the logic of a recognition of cultural difference, also asks for a non-evaluative recognition, a respect for difference. Differencerespect cannot be reduced to personal autonomy, but is oriented towards another dimension of the human condition, what we call social ties. By recognising the moral importance both of personal autonomy and of social ties, we do not have to surrender to the reductive bent in modern moral philosophy. Will Kymlicka's proposals for that matter are not fully convincing