In Defense of Global Supervenience

Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 52 (4):833-854 ()
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Abstract

Nonreductive materialism is the dominant position in the philosophy of mind. The global supervenience of the mental on the physical has been thought by some to capture the central idea of nonreductive materialism: that mental properties are ultimately dependent on, but irreducible to, physical properties. But Jaegwon Kim has argued that global psychophysical supervenience does not provide the materialist with the desired dependence of the mental on the physical, and in general that global supervenience is too weak to be an interesting dependence relation. We argue that these arguments are unsound. Along the way, we clarify the relationship between global and strong supervenience, and show clearly what sort of dependence global supervenience provides.

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Theodore Sider
Rutgers University - New Brunswick

Citations of this work

Priority monism and part/whole dependence.Alex Steinberg - 2015 - Philosophical Studies 172 (8):2025-2031.
What is Hume’s Dictum, and Why Believe It?Jessica Wilson - 2010 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 80 (3):595-637.
Global supervenience and dependence.Karen Bennett - 2004 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 68 (3):501-529.
Intrinsic properties.Theodore Sider - 1996 - Philosophical Studies 83 (1):1 - 27.

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