The ontology of epistemic reasons

Noûs 43 (3):490-512 (2009)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Epistemic reasons are mental states. They are not propositions or non-mental facts. The discussion proceeds as follows. Section 1 introduces the topic. Section 2 gives two concrete examples of how our topic directly affects the internalism/externalism debate in normative epistemology. Section 3 responds to an argument against the view that reasons are mental states. Section 4 presents two problems for the view that reasons are propositions. Section 5 presents two problems for the view that reasons are non-mental facts. Section 6 argues that reasons are mental states. Section 7 responds to objections.

Similar books and articles

Swinburne on ‘mental’ and ‘physical’.Graham Oppy - 1998 - Religious Studies 34 (4):483-495.
How many kinds of reasons?Maria Alvarez - 2009 - Philosophical Explorations 12 (2):181 – 193.
Reasons and passions.Ferenc Huoranszki - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):41-53.
How to be a teleologist about epistemic reasons.Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen - 2011 - In Asbjorn Steglich-Petersen & Andrew Reisner (eds.), Reasons for Belief. Cambridge University Press. pp. 13--33.
Reasons for belief, reasoning, virtues.Christopher Hookway - 2006 - Philosophical Studies 130 (1):47--70.
New directions in ethics: Naturalisms, reasons and virtue. [REVIEW]Soran Reader - 2000 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 3 (4):341-364.
Generalism without foundations.Manuel Hernández-Iglesias - 2006 - Acta Analytica 21 (2):71-86.
Motivation in agents.Christian Miller - 2008 - Noûs 42 (2):222–266.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-08-01

Downloads
1,002 (#12,218)

6 months
136 (#20,853)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

John Turri
University of Waterloo

Citations of this work

A Plea for Epistemic Excuses.Clayton Littlejohn - forthcoming - In Julien Dutant Fabian Dorsch (ed.), The New Evil Demon Problem. Oxford University Press.
The Importance of Being Rational.Errol Lord - 2013 - Dissertation, Princeton University
How and Why Knowledge is First.Clayton Littlejohn - 2017 - In A. Carter, E. Gordon & B. Jarvis (eds.), Knowledge First. Oxford University Press. pp. 19-45.
The Basing Relation.Ram Neta - 2019 - Philosophical Review 128 (2):179-217.

View all 70 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

The extended mind.Andy Clark & David J. Chalmers - 1998 - Analysis 58 (1):7-19.
What we owe to each other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Cambridge, Mass.: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
The moral problem.Michael Smith - 1994 - Cambridge, Mass., USA: Blackwell.
Philosophical explanations.Robert Nozick - 1981 - Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.
Mind and World.John Henry McDowell - 1994 - Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

View all 108 references / Add more references