Against the ‘there can be only one’ argument

Abstract

Quantifier Pluralism is:the view that there are different ‘kinds of existence’, which are best cashed out as different fundamental quantifiers. Timothy Williamson and Vann McGee have an argument (the ‘There Can Be Only One’ argument) that seems to refute this view. I try to defend quantifier pluralism against it, for reasons I haven’t quite fathomed yet

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Jason Turner
University of Arizona

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