AbstractThis paper argues against the common, often implicit view that theories are some specific kind of thing. Instead, I argue for theory concept pluralism: There are multiple distinct theory concepts which we legitimately use in different domains and for different purposes, and we should not expect this to change. The argument goes by analogy with species concept pluralism, a familiar position in philosophy of biology. I conclude by considering some consequences for philosophy of science if theory concept pluralism is correct.
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References found in this work
A Neurocomputational Perspective: The Nature of Mind and the Structure of Science.Paul M. Churchland - 1989 - MIT Press.
Scientific Enquiry and Natural Kinds: From Planets to Mallards.P. Magnus - 2012 - Palgrave-Macmillan.
Realist Ennui and the Base Rate Fallacy.P. D. Magnus & Craig Callender - 2004 - Philosophy of Science 71 (3):320-338.
The Tool Box of Science: Tools for the Building of Models with a Superconductivity Example.Nancy Cartwright, Towfic Shomar & Mauricio Suárez - 1995 - Poznan Studies in the Philosophy of the Sciences and the Humanities 44:137-149.
Citations of this work
Conceptual Fragmentation and the Rise of Eliminativism.Henry Taylor & Peter Vickers - 2017 - European Journal for Philosophy of Science 7 (1):17-40.
Philosophical Problems, Cluster Concepts, and the Many Lives of Molyneux’s Question.Brian R. Glenney - 2013 - Biology and Philosophy 28 (3):541-558.
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