Cognitive Science 40 (8):2122-2136 (2015)
AbstractReasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was someone else's. Among those participants who accepted the manipulation and thus thought they were evaluating someone else's argument, more than half rejected the arguments that were in fact their own. Moreover, participants were more likely to reject their own arguments for invalid than for valid answers. This demonstrates that people are more critical of other people's arguments than of their own, without being overly critical: They are better able to tell valid from invalid arguments when the arguments are someone else's rather than their own.
Similar books and articles
Evaluating Arguments From the Reaction of the Audience.Hugo Mercier & Brent Strickland - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):365 - 378.
The Pervasive Effects of Argument Length on Inductive Reasoning.Evan Heit & Caren M. Rotello - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):244 - 277.
On the Design and Function of Rational Arguments.John E. Opfer & Vladimir Sloutsky - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):85-86.
Argumentation: Its Adaptiveness and Efficacy.Hugo Mercier & Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):94-111.
Why Do Humans Reason? Arguments for an Argumentative Theory.Dan Sperber - 2011 - Behavioral and Brain Sciences 34 (2):57.
A Logical Analysis of Slippery Slope Arguments.Georg Spielthenner - 2010 - Health Care Analysis 18 (2):148-163.
Analyzing Conversational Reasoning.Merrilee H. Salmon & Colleen M. Zeitz - 1995 - Informal Logic 17 (1).
Arguing About Desirable Consequences: What Constitutes a Convincing Argument?Hans Hoeken, Rian Timmers & Peter Jan Schellens - 2012 - Thinking and Reasoning 18 (3):394 - 416.
Why Do Humans Reason? A Pragmatist Supplement to an Argumentative Theory.Howard Darmstadter - 2013 - Thinking and Reasoning 19 (3-4):472-487.
Added to PP
Historical graph of downloads
Citations of this work
Illegitimate Values, Confirmation Bias, and Mandevillian Cognition in Science.Uwe Peters - 2021 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 72 (4):1061-1081.
Disagreement and the Division of Epistemic Labor.Bjørn G. Hallsson & Klemens Kappel - 2020 - Synthese 197 (7):2823-2847.
Roles of Technical Reasoning, Theory of Mind, Creativity, and Fluid Cognition in Cumulative Technological Culture.Emmanuel De Oliveira, Emanuelle Reynaud & François Osiurak - 2019 - Human Nature 30 (3):326-340.
References found in this work
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Richard E. Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1980 - Englewood Cliffs, NJ, USA: Prentice-Hall.
Human Inference: Strategies and Shortcomings of Social Judgment.Christopher Cherniak, Richard Nisbett & Lee Ross - 1983 - Philosophical Review 92 (3):462.
Failure to Detect Mismatches Between Intention and Outcome in a Simple Decision Task.Petter Johansson, Lars Hall, Sverker Sikstrom & Andreas Olsson - 2005 - Science 310 (5745):116-119.
Lifting the Veil of Morality: Choice Blindness and Attitude Reversals on a Self-Transforming Survey.Lars Hall, Petter Johansson & Thomas Strandberg - 2012 - PLoS ONE 7 (9):e45457. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.