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  1.  65
    The Selective Laziness of Reasoning.Emmanuel Trouche, Petter Johansson, Lars Hall & Hugo Mercier - 2015 - Cognitive Science 40 (8):2122-2136.
    Reasoning research suggests that people use more stringent criteria when they evaluate others' arguments than when they produce arguments themselves. To demonstrate this “selective laziness,” we used a choice blindness manipulation. In two experiments, participants had to produce a series of arguments in response to reasoning problems, and they were then asked to evaluate other people's arguments about the same problems. Unknown to the participants, in one of the trials, they were presented with their own argument as if it was (...)
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    Experts and laymen grossly underestimate the benefits of argumentation for reasoning.Hugo Mercier, Emmanuel Trouche, Hiroshi Yama, Christophe Heintz & Vittorio Girotto - 2015 - Thinking and Reasoning 21 (3):341-355.
    Many fields of study have shown that group discussion generally improves reasoning performance for a wide range of tasks. This article shows that most of the population, including specialists, does not expect group discussion to be as beneficial as it is. Six studies asked participants to solve a standard reasoning problem—the Wason selection task—and to estimate the performance of individuals working alone and in groups. We tested samples of U.S., Indian, and Japanese participants, European managers, and psychologists of reasoning. Every (...)
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  3. Believing What You're Told: Politeness and Scalar Inferences.Diana Mazzarella, Emmanuel Trouche, Hugo Mercier & Ira Noveck - 2018 - Frontiers in Psychology 9.
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    Objective Evaluation of Demonstrative Arguments.Emmanuel Trouche, Jing Shao & Hugo Mercier - 2019 - Argumentation 33 (1):23-43.
    Many experiments suggest that participants are more critical of arguments that challenge their views or that come from untrustworthy sources. However, other results suggest that this might not be true of demonstrative arguments. A series of four experiments tested whether people are influenced by two factors when they evaluate demonstrative arguments: how confident they are in the answer being challenged by the argument, and how much they trust the source of the argument. Participants were not affected by their confidence in (...)
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