Meta‐Ethics

In Graham Oppy (ed.), A Companion to Atheism and Philosophy. Hoboken: Blackwell. pp. 341–354 (2019)
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Abstract

This chapter considers a range of views in meta‐ethics and assesses their implications for atheism. Meta‐ethical theories such as moral realism, non‐cognitivism, subjectivism, error theory, moral rationalism, and moral intuitionism will be discussed and their compatibility with atheism considered. The main conclusion of this chapter is that meta‐ethical considerations do not pose any special or insurmountable challenges to being an atheist. Atheism supports most meta‐ethical perspectives, and in some cases, offers important meta‐ethical advantages over theism.

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Elizabeth Tropman
Colorado State University

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