Presumptive Limitarianism: A Reply to Robert Huseby

In Ingrid Robeyns (ed.), Having Too Much: Philosophical Essays on Limitarianism. Cambridge, UK: Open Book Publishers. pp. 203-218 (2023)
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Abstract

In earlier work on limitarianism, I argued that setting an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have is justified when decision-makers are unaware of or disagree about the appropriate distributive criterion or if they are unaware of people’s relevant features (or both). Robert Huseby has raised several powerful objections to this presumptive argument for limitarianism. Some of these objections call for a revision of my defence of presumptive limitarianism while others call for clarification, both of which I aim to do in this chapter. I will argue that unless decision-makers have substantive reasons to suggest otherwise, they must act as if there is an upper limit to the amount of wealth that people can permissibly have.

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Dick Timmer
Dortmund University

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References found in this work

Ideal vs. Non-ideal Theory: A Conceptual Map.Laura Valentini - 2012 - Philosophy Compass 7 (9):654–664.
Why Limitarianism?Ingrid Robeyns - 2022 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (2):249-270.
Limitarianism: Pattern, Principle, or Presumption?Dick Timmer - 2021 - Journal of Applied Philosophy 38 (5):760-773.
The Limits of Limitarianism.Robert Huseby - 2022 - Journal of Political Philosophy 30 (2):230-248.
Wealth Without Limits: in Defense of Billionaires.Jessica Flanigan & Christopher Freiman - 2022 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 25 (5):755-775.

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