The Moral Value of Envy

Southern Journal of Philosophy 53 (1):36-53 (2015)
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Abstract

It is common to think that we would be morally better people if we never felt envy. Recently, some philosophers have rejected this conclusion by arguing that envy can often be directed toward unfairness or inequality. As such, they conclude that we should not suppress our feelings of envy. I argue, however, that these defenses only show that envy is sometimes morally permissible. In order to show that we would not be better off without envy, we must show how envy is not merely morally permissible, but morally valuable. Here I provide a defense of envy's moral value. I argue that feelings of envy are integral to the value that moral agents place on the goods and talents that they judge to be central to a worthwhile life

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Krista Thomason
Swarthmore College

Citations of this work

Let the donkeys be donkeys: in defense of inspiring envy.Maria Silvia Vaccarezza & Ariele Niccoli - 2022 - In Sara Protasi (ed.), The Moral Psychology of Envy. Rowman & Littlefield Publishers. pp. 111-127.
Framing the Role of Envy in Transitional Justice.Emanuela Ceva & Sara Protasi - 2023 - Passion: Journal of the European Philosophical Society for the Study of Emotion 1 (1):68-84.
Forgiveness and the Multiple Functions of Anger.Antony G. Aumann & Zac Cogley - 2019 - Journal of Philosophy of Emotion 1 (1):44-71.
Envy and us.Alessandro Salice & Alba Montes Sánchez - 2018 - European Journal of Philosophy 27 (1):227-242.

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References found in this work

A Theory of Justice: Revised Edition.John Rawls - 1999 - Harvard University Press.
Anarchy, State, and Utopia.Robert Nozick - 1974 - New York: Basic Books.
Freedom and Resentment.Peter Strawson - 1962 - Proceedings of the British Academy 48:187-211.
A theory of justice.John Rawls - 2009 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring ethics: an introductory anthology. Oxford: Oxford University Press. pp. 133-135.

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