Abstract

Harm experiences are defined by two sets of traits. In the first place, by the double type of modality of its experience: in contrast with the type of negativity that has been traditionally understood as evil, harm is defined not by its being or being experienced as necessary but by its negative possibility-what is not necessary that it should happen or have happened-and by the practical necessity that it should not happen again. In the second place, harm experiences are worked through in non-symmetrical relational structures between victims or survivors, wrongdoers or victimizers, and the set of third-party figures that attend to them and adopt a concerned attitude towards them, when this is achieved. In virtue of the first set of traits, harms are open to their closure that is articulated, at least, in three types of labors or tasks: its cessation, its reparation or cure, and the commitment of its non-repetition. In virtue of the second set of traits, these tasks entail differential authorities and responsibilities in the three types of figures involved in experiences of harm.