Abstract

Karol Wojtyla’s The Acting Person is devoted to articulating how the experience and structure of action reveals that the person is an objective/subjective unity whose self-fulfillment is achieved by moral praxis. Wojtyla is attempting to harmonize the Boethian-Thomistic definition of man as an individual substance of a rational nature with a modern, phenomenological vision of man as an incommunicable subject. In doing so, he adopts what might be termed a “maximalist” interpretation of Boethius’ definition, an interpretation that understands the basic concepts of substance, rationality, and nature as part of a deeper unity that also includes the aspects of subjectivity, consciousness, and personal love. This unity is revealed through a phenomenological description of action. Wojtyla’s personalist synthesis depends upon establishing the compatibility of the Aristotelian-Thomistic understanding of human nature with his own phenomenological analysis. This article differentiates Wojtyla’s various uses of the term nature, indicating where he departs from or develops traditional views. Most important is Wojtyla’s conclusion that while the natural order possesses its own integrity, it can only properly be understood in light of the personal order, or the order of love. Love alone integrates the person, enabling him to both fully realize and transcend his natural potentialities. Consequently, the person can only partially be identified with his human nature because his end lies in an order of love beyond the natural realm.