Abstract

This dissertation examines those aspects of Karol Wojtyla's personalism which bear on the contemporary debate over the ontological status of human embryological life. Not only is Wojtyla's philosophical analysis of personhood examined, but also those influences that have helped shape the broader contours of his thought. Finally, a dialogue is established between Wojtyla and other authors who have analyzed the issue of the ontological status of developing human life. ;First considered are the more significant influences on his personal life and then the main theological an philosophical influences on his thought. The impact that the "love" mysticism of St. John of the Cross has on his poetry is explained, as well as how Wojtyla's study of faith in St. John deepens his own faith, and helps him value the importance of lived-experience, especially the experience of Christ. The significance of the philosophy and personal qualities of St. Thomas Aquinas on Wojtyla's life and thought are discussed, as is the influence of continental phenomenology, especially that of Max Scheler. Wojtyla's notion of person is then explained, especially those aspects of personhood relevant to the issue of the ontological status of human embryological life. The phenomenon of human dynamism is emphasized, and especially stressed is the importance of Wojtyla's distinction between personal action which always involves free choice, and human activation where something happens to us from within. In this context, Wojtyla sees activations caused by human nature while actions are specifically caused by the person. Nevertheless, he does not allow for any ontological cleavage between nature and person, but insists that the person is the subject of both action and activation. Human nature is thus seen as integrated into a specific personal structural nucleus, even though it indicates a different causal basis of the subject than the person. This integration of both action and activation in the personal subjects is the basis of Wojtyla's claim that consciousness, as important as it is in the development of the person in terms of action, is not the ontological ground of human personal life. ;The final section of this dissertation is a dialogue between Wojtyla and several other authors, including myself, who have analyzed the issue of the ontological status of human embryological life. Since so many biological facts and processes are referred to by various authors writing on this issue, an Appendix is provided which summarizes the biological development of human embryological life. ;Since Wojtyla's claim that human life must be protected from its earliest moments stems more from intuitions of faith and his fidelity to the Roman Catholic Church's teaching than from his philosophical analyses, it is argued that Wojtyla could philosophically accept the position of those, including myself, who maintain that individuation does not take place at the moment of fertilization but some days later. Finally, in response to those who claim that personhood is established only when consciousness or self-consciousness is manifested, Wojtyla argues that consciousness is not a necessary condition of human personhood, but rather a mirroring and illuminating function of the already existing person. Wojtyla believes that this approach fully incorporates the vegetative and other somatic dynamisms of the human person, whose existence is not usually mirrored in consciousness, with emotional and rational activities through which we constitute ourselves as personal in the fullest sense