Mercy

Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 103 (2):101–132 (2003)
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Abstract

Mercy is a form of charity towards wrongdoers that justifies punishing them less severely than they deserve according to justice. Three main objections to mercy, or its exercise by organs of the state-that it is irrational, unjust and procedurally unfair-are addressed in the course of defending mercy as a value that has a place in deliberation about criminal punishment. The paper draws on both the communicative theory of punishment and aspects of existing legal practice in mounting this defence.

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Citations of this work

Rights reclamation.William L. Bell - 2024 - Philosophical Studies 181 (4):835-858.
Amnesty and Mercy.Patrick Lenta - 2019 - Criminal Law and Philosophy 13 (4):621-641.
Contractualism and Punishment.Hon-Lam Li - 2015 - Criminal Justice Ethics 34 (2):177-209.
Critical Mercy in Criminal Law.Kristen Bell - 2023 - Law and Philosophy 42 (4):351-378.

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