We Should Not Be a Counterpart Theorist of Events If We Want to Be a Counterfactual Theorist of Causation

Theoria 87 (5):1038-1049 (2021)
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Abstract

Although David Lewis advocates a counterpart-theoretic treatment of objects but rejects a parallel treatment of events, many philosophers have — mainly to solve some puzzles within the framework of a Lewisian counterfactual analysis of causation — suggested that the counterpart-theoretic treatment be extended to events. This article argues that we had better not be a counterpart theorist of events as long as we want to remain at all faithful to the counterfactual analysis of causation.

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Zhiheng Tang
Shandong University

Citations of this work

Timeless Causation?Zhiheng Tang - 2023 - Acta Analytica 38 (3):471-479.

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References found in this work

New work for a theory of universals.David K. Lewis - 1983 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 61 (4):343-377.
On the Plurality of Worlds.David Lewis - 1986 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 178 (3):388-390.
Counterfactuals.David Lewis - 1973 - Foundations of Language 13 (1):145-151.
Causation as influence.David Lewis - 2000 - Journal of Philosophy 97 (4):182-197.
Omissions as possibilities.Sara Bernstein - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):1-23.

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