Moral cognitivism and motivation

Philosophical Review 108 (2):161-219 (1999)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

The impact moral judgments have on our deliberations and actions seems to vary a great deal. Moral judgments play a large part in the lives of some people, who are apt not only to make them, but also to be guided by them in the sense that they tend to pursue what they judge to be of moral value, and shun what they judge to be of moral disvalue. But it seems unrealistic to claim that moral judgments play a pervasive role in the lives of all or even most people. There are considerable variations in how strong a tendency people have to think in moral terms, and in how such thoughts affect their decisions and actions. For every moral hero who single- mindedly pursues moral values, there are thousands of less com- mitted people who only do so when it does not cost them too much in material comfort, personal relations, or social standing. And of course, what counts as too much varies from person to person. On top of such variations, there are those who consistently display mor- al indifference-people who concede, for example, that certain investment policies have morally problematic consequences, but who can readily and without compunction ignore that in their busi- ness decisions. There even seem to be moral subversives, people who intentionally and knowingly pursue what they acknourledge to be morally u~ong or bad, and do so for that very reason

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,881

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Moral Cognitivism.Hallvard Lillehammer - 2002 - Philosophical Papers 31 (1):1-25.
Moral motivation pluralism.Ragnar Francén - 2010 - The Journal of Ethics 14 (2):117-148.
The Pragmatics of Moral Motivation.Caj Strandberg - 2011 - The Journal of Ethics 15 (4):341-369.
What’s Wrong with Morality?C. Daniel Batson - 2011 - Emotion Review 3 (3):230-236.
Evaluation, uncertainty and motivation.Michael Smith - 2002 - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 5 (3):305-320.
The motivation argument for non-cognitivism.Michael Smith - 2009 - In Charles R. Pigden (ed.), Hume on Motivation and Virtue. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 105.
Non-cognitivism and motivation.Nick Zangwill - 2009 - In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 416--24.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-01-28

Downloads
573 (#31,277)

6 months
49 (#88,787)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Sigrun Svavarsdottir
Tufts University

Citations of this work

Running risks morally.Brian Weatherson - 2014 - Philosophical Studies 167 (1):141-163.
The Authority of Formality.Jack Woods - 2018 - Oxford Studies in Metaethics 13.
Believing For a Reason.John Turri - 2011 - Erkenntnis 74 (3):383-397.
Motivational Internalism & Disinterestedness.Ryan P. Doran - forthcoming - British Journal of Aesthetics.
Moral Worth and Moral Knowledge.Paulina Sliwa - 2015 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 93 (2):393-418.

View all 123 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral realism.Peter Railton - 1986 - Philosophical Review 95 (2):163-207.
A Sensible Subjectivism.David Wiggins - 1987 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1985 - In James Rachels (ed.), Ethical Theory 1: The Question of Objectivity. Oxford University Press.
Moral Explanations.Nicholas Sturgeon - 1984 - In David Copp & David Zimmerman (eds.), Morality, Reason and Truth. Totowa, NJ: pp. 49-78.

View all 7 references / Add more references