Non-cognitivism and motivation

In Constantine Sandis (ed.), New Essays on the Explanation of Action. Palgrave-Macmillan. pp. 416--24 (2009)
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Abstract

In sum, the non-cognitivist account of motivation is far from unproblematic. The non-cognitivist has trouble telling us what moral attitudes are in a way that is consistent with the phenomenon of variable motivation. Given that the cognitivist has an easy explanation of variable motivation, it seems that cognitivism is preferable to non-cognitivism on the score of motivation, which is a reversal of the way the issue is usually perceived.

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Nick Zangwill
University College London

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