Moral luck and partialist theories

Journal of Value Inquiry 30 (1-2):213-227 (1996)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

I argue that partialist theories that require us to give special weight to the desires, needs, and interests of ourselves or our social group, are national. I depend this impartialist principle: if the only difference between two persons to some property, where having the property to dependent on luck, morality's demanding that we disfavor either person because the person has this property, to national

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,127

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability.Gregory Stoutenburg - 2020 - Logos and Episteme 11 (1):97-109.
Constitutive Moral Luck and Strawson's Argument for the Impossibility of Moral Responsibility.Robert J. Hartman - 2018 - Journal of the American Philosophical Association 4 (2):165-183.
Is Morality Immune to Luck, after All? Criminal Behavior and the Paradox of Moral Luck.Evangelos D. Protopapadakis - 2022 - In Evangelos D. Protopapadakis & Georgios Arabatzis (eds.), Modernity and Contemporaneity. The NKUA Applied Philosophy Research Lab Press. pp. 161-180.
Rationality, Success, and Luck.Ram Neta - 2021 - Acta Analytica 37 (1):57-71.
Special Relationships and Impartiality.Mary Louis Stevenson - 1988 - Dissertation, University of Colorado at Boulder
On the Moral Currency of Human Needs.Martino Traxler - 1997 - Dissertation, Cornell University

Analytics

Added to PP
2013-01-04

Downloads
37 (#445,119)

6 months
5 (#710,311)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Anita Superson
University of Kentucky

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50 (1):115-152.
Persons, Character, and Morality.Bernard Williams - 1976 - In James Rachels (ed.), Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980. Cambridge University Press.
Moral Luck.B. A. O. Williams & T. Nagel - 1976 - Aristotelian Society Supplementary Volume 50:115 - 151.
Moral Luck.Bernard Williams - 1981 - Critica 17 (51):101-105.
Moral Luck.Thomas Nagel - 1993 - In Daniel Statman (ed.), Moral Luck. State University of New York Press. pp. 141--166.

View all 11 references / Add more references