Luck, Knowledge, and Epistemic Probability

Logos and Episteme 11 (1):97-109 (2020)
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Abstract

Epistemic probability theories of luck come in two versions. They are easiest to distinguish by the epistemic property they claim eliminates luck. One view says that the property is knowledge. The other view says that the property is being guaranteed by a subject’s evidence. Asbjørn Steglich-Petersen defends the Knowledge Account (KA). He has recently argued that his view is preferable to my Epistemic Analysis of Luck (EAL), which defines luck in terms of evidential probability. In this paper, I defend EAL against Steglich-Petersen’s arguments, clarify the view, and argue for the explanatory significance of EAL with respect to some core epistemological issues. My overall goal is to show that an epistemic probability account of luck rooted in the concepts of evidence and evidential support remains a viable and fruitful overall account of luck.

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Gregory Stoutenburg
York College Of Pennsylvania

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Against epistemic accounts of luck.Jesse Hill - 2023 - Analysis 83 (3):474-482.

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