Philosophy Compass 4 (5):768-779 (2009)

Authors
Jussi Suikkanen
University of Birmingham
Abstract
This paper explores the so-called buck-passing accounts of value. These views attempt to use normative notions, such as reasons and ought to explain evaluative notions, such as goodness and value . Thus, according to Scanlon's well-known view, the property of being good is the formal, higher-order property of having some more basic properties that provide reasons to have certain kind of valuing attitudes towards the objects. I begin by tracing some of the long history of such accounts. I then describe the arguments which are typically used to motivate these views. The rest of this article investigates how some of the central details of the buck-passing accounts should be specified, and what kind of problems these views face.
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DOI 10.1111/j.1747-9991.2009.00253.x
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References found in this work BETA

What We Owe to Each Other.Thomas Scanlon - 1998 - Belknap Press of Harvard University Press.
Principia Ethica.George Edward Moore - 1903 - Dover Publications.

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Citations of this work BETA

Intrinsic Vs. Extrinsic Value.Michael J. Zimmerman - 2019 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Value Theory.Mark Schroeder - 2008 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Reasons as Explanations.John Brunero - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 165 (3):805-824.

View all 16 citations / Add more citations

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