Opportunity and preference learning: A reply to Christian Schubert

Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):297-303 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

:This paper replies to Christian Schubert's critical review of my work on opportunity as a normative criterion. Schubert argues that the criterion I have proposed would not command general assent because it does not recognize the legitimacy of individuals’ preferences for achieving self-development by constraining their future opportunities. I argue that my account of the ‘responsible agent’ is compatible with self-development, and that preferences for self-constraint are less common than Schubert suggests. For the purposes of normative economics, my opportunity criterion is much more generally applicable than Schubert's criterion of ‘opportunity to learn’.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 93,098

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-08-27

Downloads
14 (#1,019,789)

6 months
6 (#587,779)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Robert Sugden
University of East Anglia

References found in this work

Utilitarianism and welfarism.Amartya Sen - 1979 - Journal of Philosophy 76 (9):463-489.
Opportunity and Preference Learning.Christian Schubert - 2015 - Economics and Philosophy 31 (2):275-295.
Hume's non-instrumental and non-propositional decision theory.Robert Sugden - 2006 - Economics and Philosophy 22 (3):365-391.

Add more references