Scott Sturgeon
University of Birmingham
Consider the frame S believes that—. Fill it with a conditional, say If you eat an Apple, you'll drink a Coke. what makes the result true? More generally, what facts are marked by instances of S believes ? In a sense the answer is obious: beliefs are so marked. Yet that bromide leads directly to competing schools of thought. And the reason is simple. Common-sense thinks of belief two ways. Sometimes it sees it as a three-part affair. When so viewed either you believe, disbelieve, or suspend judgment. This take on belief is coarse-grained . It says belief has three flavours: acceptance, rejection, neither. But it's not the only way common-sense thinks of belief. Sometimes it's more subtle: ‘How strong is your faith?’ can be apposite between believers. That signals an important fact. Ordinary practice also treats belief as a fine-grained affair. It speaks of levels of confidence. It admits degrees of belief . It contains a fine-grained take as well. There are two ways belief is seen in everyday life. One is coarse-grained. The other is fine-grained
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1017/S1358246100008146
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy

Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 71,316
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

Probability and Conditionals.Ellery Eells & Brian Skyrms - 1997 - Erkenntnis 46 (2):273-276.

Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Confidence and Coarse-Grained Attitudes.Scott Sturgeon - 2010 - In T. Szabo Gendler & J. Hawthorne (eds.), Oxford Studies in Epistemology. Oxford University Press. pp. 3--126.

Add more citations

Similar books and articles

The Ramsey Test and Conditional Semantics.Frank Döring - 1997 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 26 (4):359-376.
Iterated Revision and Minimal Change of Conditional Beliefs.Craig Boutilier - 1996 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 25 (3):263 - 305.
A Defence of the Ramsey Test.Richard Bradley - 2007 - Mind 116 (461):1-21.
Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.J. Robert & G. Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
Counterfactual Triviality: A Lewis-Impossibility Argument for Counterfactuals.Robert Williams - 2012 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 85 (3):648-670.
On the Ramsey Test Without Triviality.Hannes Leitgeb - 2010 - Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54.
A Ranking‐Theoretic Approach to Conditionals.Wolfgang Spohn - 2013 - Cognitive Science 37 (6):1074-1106.
New Surprises for the Ramsey Test.Malte Willer - 2010 - Synthese 176 (2):291 - 309.
Ramsey + Moore ≠ God.David Barnett - 2008 - Analysis 68 (2):168 - 174.


Added to PP index

Total views
39 ( #293,054 of 2,519,441 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
1 ( #407,861 of 2,519,441 )

How can I increase my downloads?


My notes