On the Ramsey Test without Triviality

Notre Dame Journal of Formal Logic 51 (1):21-54 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

We present a way of classifying the logically possible ways out of Gärdenfors' inconsistency or triviality result on belief revision with conditionals. For one of these ways—conditionals which are not descriptive but which only have an inferential role as being given by the Ramsey test—we determine which of the assumptions in three different versions of Gärdenfors' theorem turn out to be false. This is done by constructing ranked models in which such Ramsey-test conditionals are evaluated and which are subject to natural postulates on belief revision and acceptability sets for conditionals. Along the way we show that in contrast with what Gärdenfors himself proposed, there is no dichotomy of the form: either the Ramsey test has to be given up or the Preservation condition. Instead, both of them follow from our postulates

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,853

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-09-13

Downloads
121 (#148,699)

6 months
6 (#518,648)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Hannes Leitgeb
Ludwig Maximilians Universität, München

Citations of this work

HYPE: A System of Hyperintensional Logic.Hannes Leitgeb - 2019 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 48 (2):305-405.
Indicative Conditionals and Graded Information.Ivano Ciardelli - 2020 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 49 (3):509-549.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Two modellings for theory change.Adam Grove - 1988 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 17 (2):157-170.
Dynamic logic for belief revision.Johan van Benthem - 2007 - Journal of Applied Non-Classical Logics 17 (2):129-155.

View all 13 references / Add more references