Optimal Committee Composition: Diversity, Bias, and Size

Abstract

The Condorcet Jury Theorem, together with a large and growing literature of ancillary results, suggests two conclusions. First, large committees outperform small committees, other things equal. Second, heterogeneous committees can, under the right circumstances, outperform homogeneous ones, again other things equal. But this literature has done little to bring these two conclusions together. This paper compares the respective contributions of size and difference to optimal committee performance, and draws policy recommendations using these comparisons.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 94,070

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

  • Only published works are available at libraries.

Analytics

Added to PP
2015-09-07

Downloads
17 (#866,957)

6 months
7 (#592,070)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations