Who's Afraid of Determinism?

Philosophy 89 (3):431-450 (2014)
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Abstract

Because of the idealizations involved in the ideas of a total state of the world and of all the laws of nature, the thesis of all-encompassing determinism is unverifiable. Our everyday non-scientific talk of causation does not imply determinism; nor is it needed for the Kantian argument for a general causal framework as a condition for experience of an objective world. Determinism is at best a regulative ideal for science, something to be approached but never reached.

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10.1017/s0031819113000867

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References found in this work

Free Will.G. Watson - 1984 - Critical Philosophy 1 (1):97.
An Essay on Free Will by Peter van Inwagen. [REVIEW]Michael Slote - 1985 - Journal of Philosophy 82 (6):327-330.
The Freedom of the Will.Austin Farrer - 1958 - British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 11 (41):82-83.

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