Abstract

Aristotle provides two extended discussions on the subject of pleasure within the Nicomachean Ethics. The first, which comprises the last four chapters of Book 7, produces a definition of pleasure in which pleasure is identified with activity (energeia). But in the second discussion of pleasure—provided in the first five chapters of Book 10-this position is characterized as "strange" or "absurd" (1175b 35). Instead of an identification between the two, pleasure is now said to "supervene" upon activity "as the bloom of youth does on those in the flower of their youth" (1174b 33). Why this difference in the characterization of pleasure? Is Aristotle here committing the simple inconsistency of which he appears to be guilty? In the first section of this paper I shall argue that he is not. In the second section of this paper I shall suggest some reasons as to why Aristotle's interests in the subject of pleasure changed in the relatively short interim between Book 7 and Book 10.