The Persisting Problem of Precedent Autonomy Among Persons in a Minimally Conscious State: The Limitations of Philosophical Analysis and Clinical Assessment

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American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 9 (2):120-127 (2018)
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10.1080/21507740.2018.1459932

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What are we?Eric T. Olson - 2007 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 14 (5-6):37-55.
The Human Animal. Personal identity without psychology.Eric T. Olson - 1997 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 192 (1):112-113.
Personal Identity and Dead People.David Mackie - 1999 - Philosophical Studies 95 (3):219-242.
Is That the Same Person? Case Studies in Neurosurgery.Nancy S. Jecker & Andrew L. Ko - 2017 - American Journal of Bioethics Neuroscience 8 (3):160-170.

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