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Suspension as Spandrel
Episteme 16 (4):357-368 (2019)
Abstract
A telic virtue epistemology was presupposed in our treatment of insight and understanding. What follows will lay out the main elements of that telic theory and explore how it provides an epistemology of suspension.Author's Profile
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Citations of this work
Being neutral: Agnosticism, inquiry and the suspension of judgment.Matthew McGrath - 2021 - Noûs 55 (2):463-484.
You ought to have known: positive epistemic norms in a knowledge-first framework.Jonathan Jenkins Ichikawa - 2022 - Synthese 200 (5):1-23.
When Evidence Isn’t Enough: Suspension, Evidentialism, and Knowledge-First Virtue Epistemology.Lisa Miracchi - 2019 - Episteme 16 (4):413-437.
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