Noûs 55 (2):463-484 (2021)

Authors
Matthew McGrath
Washington University in St. Louis
Abstract
Epistemologists often claim that in addition to belief and disbelief there is a third, neutral, doxastic attitude. Various terms are used: ‘suspending judgment’, ‘withholding’, ‘agnosticism’. It is also common to claim that the factors relevant to the justification of these attitudes are epistemic in the narrow sense of being factors that bear on the strength or weakness of one’s epistemic position with respect to the target proposition. This paper addresses two challenges to such traditionalism about doxastic attitudes. The first concerns the relevance of non-epistemic factors we might call "future-comparative" – e.g., that you’ll have more decisive evidence on whether p tomorrow – to the justification of suspending judgment. The second, from Jane Friedman, is to explain the point of the neutral attitude without appealing to inquiry and thus taking goal-related factors, which are not epistemic, such as the value of the goal or the prospects for finding means to achieve it, to bear on the justification of the neutral attitude. My defense of traditionalism relies on distinguishing three ways of being neutral on a question: agnosticism, inquiry and suspension of judgment. Traditionalism is saved because, of these, agnosticism alone is a genuine doxastic attitude.
Keywords suspension of judgment  belief  inquiry
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DOI 10.1111/nous.12323
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References found in this work BETA

Elusive Knowledge.David K. Lewis - 1996 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 74 (4):549 – 567.
Doxastic Deliberation.Nishi Shah & J. David Velleman - 2005 - Philosophical Review 114 (4):497-534.
Why Suspend Judging?Jane Friedman - 2017 - Noûs 51 (2):302-326.
Suspended Judgment.Jane Friedman - 2013 - Philosophical Studies 162 (2):165-181.
The Aim of Belief.Ralph Wedgwood - 2002 - Philosophical Perspectives 16:267-97.

View all 30 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

Thinking and Being Sure.Jeremy Goodman & Ben Holguín - forthcoming - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research:1-27.
Inquiring Minds Want to Improve.Arianna Falbo - forthcoming - Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Disbelief is a distinct doxastic attitude.Joshua Smart - 2020 - Synthese 198 (12):11797-11813.
Agnosticism as Settled Indecision.Verena Wagner - 2022 - Philosophical Studies 179 (2):671-697.

View all 11 citations / Add more citations

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