Abstract

Evolutionary psychology (EP) theorizes that contemporary women and men differ psychologically, particularly in mating and sexuality. It is further argued that EP research on gender-specific psychological differences is compatible with feminist perspectives. This paper analyzes if integrating EP scholarship on gender differences into feminist scholarship is possible by investigating EP’s core scientific commitments. I will argue that EP’s theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings that pertain to the study of gender do not align with its core values based on Longino’s feminist theoretical virtues as outlined in the 1996 article “Cognitive and Non-Cognitive Values in Science: Rethinking the Dichotomy.” I employ feminist theoretical virtues as tools for revealing how certain theories, models, and hypotheses rely upon, promote contentious norms, and suppress gender. I will defend the thesis that EP theories, hypotheses, and empirical findings are often empirically inadequate, androcentric, and ontologically too homogeneous. Further, EP employs single-factor control models, has no straightforward practical application, and might even be politically dangerous. These characteristics challenge a successful integration of EP into feminism.