On the what-it-is-like-Ness of experience

Southern Journal of Philosophy 48 (1):8-27 (2010)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

It is common for philosophers to hold that experience can be characterized in a basic way as being something it is like for someone to undergo. In the paper it is argued that when this slogan is examined it is in some respects trivial and in others mistaken. It is concluded that the slogan should be abandoned.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,829

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

An Argument for Nonreductive Representationalism.Richard Gray - 2010 - American Philosophical Quarterly 47 (4):365-376.
Naturalizing Subjective Character.Uriah Kriegel - 2005 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (1):23-57.
In Defense of the What-It-Is-Likeness of Experience.Greg Janzen - 2011 - Southern Journal of Philosophy 49 (3):271-293.
Back to Brentano?Dan Zahavi - 2004 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 11 (10-11):66-87.

Analytics

Added to PP
2010-04-09

Downloads
347 (#58,100)

6 months
10 (#265,304)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Citations of this work

The philosophical significance of the De Se.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2017 - Inquiry: An Interdisciplinary Journal of Philosophy 60 (3):253-276.
The fragmentation of phenomenal character.Neil Mehta - 2021 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 104 (1):209-231.

View all 27 citations / Add more citations

References found in this work

Mortal questions.Thomas Nagel - 1979 - New York: Cambridge University Press.
Thinking About Consciousness.David Papineau - 2002 - Oxford, GB: Oxford University Press UK.
Mortal Questions.[author unknown] - 1979 - Tijdschrift Voor Filosofie 43 (3):578-578.

View all 10 references / Add more references