We-thinking and vacillation between frames: filling a gap in Bacharach’s theory

Theory and Decision 73 (4):539-560 (2012)
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Abstract

We-thinking theories allow groups to deliberate as agents. They have been introduced into the economic domain for both theoretical and empirical reasons. Among the few scholars who have proposed formal approaches to illustrate how we-thinking arises, Bacharach offers one of the most developed theories from the game theoretic point of view. He presents a number of intuitions, not always mutually consistent and not fully developed. In this article, I propose a way to complete Bacharach’s theory, generalizing the interdependence hypothesis and building on his intuition about vacillation. It is a simple model of vacillation between the I and we-modes of reasoning, as a way in which we-thinking can come to mind in the face of a decision problem. The vacillation model makes we-reasoning more easily usable in game theory.

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Alessandra Smerilli
University of East Anglia

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On Social Facts.Margaret Gilbert - 1989 - Ethics 102 (4):853-856.
Natural reasons: personality and polity.Susan L. Hurley - 1989 - New York: Oxford University Press.
The importance of us: a philosophical study of basic social notions.Raimo Tuomela - 1995 - Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.

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