Abstract
Over the last few decades, there have been intense debates concerning the effects of
markets on the morality of individuals’ behaviour. On the one hand, several authors
argue that markets’ ongoing expansion tends to undermine individuals’ intentions for
mutual benefit and virtuous character traits and actions. On the other hand, leading
economists and philosophers characterize markets as a domain of intentional
cooperation for mutual benefit that promotes many of the character traits and actions
that traditional virtue ethics accounts classify as virtuous. In this paper, I join this
debate and argue for three claims of general interest to philosophers, economists and
policy makers. First, market transactions do not reliably promote individuals’
intentions for mutual benefit, and often select against such intentions. Second, the set
of so-called market virtues lacks a substantial overlap with the set of character traits
that traditional virtue ethics accounts classify as virtuous. And third, many seemingly
virtuous actions observed in market contexts are merely actions in accordance with
virtue rather than genuine actions from virtue. These three claims do not license
opposition to markets, but challenge the main empirical and theoretical presuppositions
of leading virtue ethics defences of markets.