Diachronous and Synchronous Selves

Canadian Journal of Philosophy 6 (1):13 - 33 (1976)
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Abstract

We talk of the differences between the old Camus and the new Camus. Often such talk is equivalent to talk of the differences between Camus’ old self and Camus’ new self, between Camus’ diachronous selves. In other contexts, contexts which I shall ignore, the old and the new Camus is something we can read, provide literary criticism of, ponder over. In these contexts it is to the literary works of the old and new Camus that we are referring. The same kind of ambiguity attaches to the expressions ‘the early Beethoven’ and ‘the later Beethoven’.

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XII—Error, Faith and Self-Deception.Patrick Gardiner - 1970 - Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 70 (1):221-244.
Philosophy and personal relations. An anglo-french study.Alan Montefiore - 1973 - Revue Philosophique de la France Et de l'Etranger 166 (1):100-102.

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