Abstract

abstract One way in which we may be tempted to understand the distinction we make in practice between liberals and fundamentalists is via the issue of truth. Liberals are generally more sceptical about truth while fundamentalists tend to be more objectivist, believing not only that objective truth exists but also that they know it. I call this interpretation the ‘truth interpretation’. In this paper I attempt to undermine the ‘truth interpretation’ by showing that it does not map on adequately to the sorts of distinctions that we actually make in practice. We will see that thinking that the distinction between liberals and fundamentalists revolves around the philosophical issue of truth, such that the ‘good guys’ are sceptics and the ‘bad guys’ objectivists, fails to connect with our practical distinctions. The second half of the paper then addresses the question of what role, if any, truth does play in distinguishing between liberals and fundamentalists, arguing that if truth does play a role we should see it as a very narrow and political, rather, than philosophical one.