Deflationary Truth and Truth-Biology

Studia Philosophica Estonica 1 (2):265-283 (2008)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Many or almost all writers about truth seem to agree that the entailment by a more or less formal account of truth of all the instances of the so-called disquotational schema - (DQ) <p> is true if and only if p - is at least a necessary condition for this account to count as an adequate account of truth. My first task in this paper is to show that the correctness of the observation (DQ) does not by itself imply that truth lacks substance. My second task is to establish the instances of (DQ) as not only necessary but also sufficient for a characterisation of truth. Such a minimal theory of truth would seem to rob truth of all substance but going in for a more eloquent alternative as I shall attempt to show could result in an unwanted epistemisation of truth.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 92,907

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

Truth-Bearers and Modesty.Manuel García-Carpintero - 2011 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 82 (1):49–75.
Varieties of Deflationism.Dorit Bar-On & Keith Simmons - 2006 - In Ernest Lepore & Barry C. Smith (eds.), The Oxford Handbook to the Philosophy of Language. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
On Horwich's way out.Panu Raatikainen - 2005 - Analysis 65 (3):175-177.
Emotivism and deflationary truth.Kyle S. Swan - 2002 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 83 (3):270–281.
Truth-meaning-reality.Paul Horwich - 2010 - New York: Oxford University Press.
Theories of truth and convention T.Douglas Patterson - 2002 - Philosophers' Imprint 2:1-16.

Analytics

Added to PP
2009-11-23

Downloads
40 (#408,589)

6 months
6 (#581,938)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references