Truth-Tellers in Bradwardine's Theory of Truth

Abstract

Bradwardine’s account from Buridan’s [5, 6]. What are we to make of this? If the argument fails, what distinguishes problematic truth-tellers (such as a sentence that explicitly says of itself that it is true) from benign truth tellers? It is my task in this paper to explain this distinction, and to clarify the behaviour of truth-tellers, given my the contemporary formal treatment of Bradwardine’s account of signification.

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2009-06-22

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Greg Restall
University of Melbourne

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References found in this work

Outline of a theory of truth.Saul Kripke - 1975 - Journal of Philosophy 72 (19):690-716.
Propositional quantifiers.Dorothy L. Grover - 1972 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 1 (2):111 - 136.
Paradox, truth and logic part I: Paradox and truth.Peter W. Woodruff - 1984 - Journal of Philosophical Logic 13 (2):213 - 232.
Symmetry and Paradox.Stephen Read - 2006 - History and Philosophy of Logic 27 (4):307-318.

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