Review of Philosophy and Psychology 13 (1):239-255 (2021)

Authors
Krzysztof Sękowski
University of Warsaw
Wiktor Rorot
University of Warsaw
Abstract
The discussion of the nature of consciousness seems to have stalled, with the “hard problem of consciousness” in its center, well-defined camps of realists and eliminativists at two opposing poles, and little to none room for agreement between. Recent attempts to move this debate forward by shifting them to a meta-level have heavily relied on the notion of “intuition”, understood in a rather liberal way. Against this backdrop, the goal of this paper is twofold. First, we want to highlight how the ontological and epistemological status of intuitions restricts the arguments in the debate on consciousness that rely on them. Second, we want to demonstrate how the deadlock in those debates could be resolved through a study of a particular, “positive” kind of intuitions. We call this approach “The Canberrish Plan for Consciousness” as it adopts elements of the methodological “Canberra Plan”.
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DOI 10.1007/s13164-021-00533-w
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Zombie Intuitions.Eugen Fischer & Justin Sytsma - forthcoming - Cognition.

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