Four conceptions of the hard problem of consciousness

Journal of Consciousness Studies 22 (9-10):129-44 (2015)
  Copy   BIBTEX

Abstract

Though widely discussed, the hard problem of consciousness (‘the hard problem’ hereafter) is surprisingly difficult to pin down. In fact, one may see that not just a couple of plausible conceptions of the problem exist but rather four do. After providing some background for the hard problem, I present and clarify these four conceptions of it. I close by providing some key considerations for and against each of the four conceptions without passing final judgment on any of them. Ultimately, though, we do need to come to a resolution in so far as one is possible.

Links

PhilArchive



    Upload a copy of this work     Papers currently archived: 91,386

External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server

Through your library

Similar books and articles

On The Infinitely Hard Problem Of Consciousness.Bernard Molyneux - 2011 - Australasian Journal of Philosophy 89 (2):211 - 228.
Hard, Harder, Hardest.Katalin Balog - 2019 - In Arthur Sullivan (ed.), Sensations, Thoughts, and Language: Essays in Honor of Brian Loar. New York, NY: Routledge. pp. 265-289.
There is no hard problem of consciousness.Kieron O'Hara & Tom Scutt - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (4):290-302.
Giving up on the hard problem of consciousness.Eugene Mills - 1996 - Journal of Consciousness Studies 3 (1):26-32.
What Mary’s Aboutness Is About.Martina Fürst - 2011 - Acta Analytica 26 (1):63-74.
Real acquaintance and physicalism.Philip Goff - 2015 - In Paul Coates & Sam Coleman (eds.), Phenomenal Qualities: Sense, Perception and Consciousness. Oxford University Press.
The Rise and Fall of the Mind-Body Problem.Katalin Balog - forthcoming - In Corine Besson, Anandi Hattiangadi & Romina Padro (eds.), Meaning, Modality and Mind: Essays Commemorating the 50th Anniversary of Naming and Necessity. Oxford University Press.

Analytics

Added to PP
2016-02-19

Downloads
160 (#116,397)

6 months
11 (#225,837)

Historical graph of downloads
How can I increase my downloads?

Author's Profile

Jonathan Eric Dorsey
University of California, Davis

Citations of this work

No citations found.

Add more citations

References found in this work

No references found.

Add more references