Abstract

The replacement, under totalitarian regimes, of multiple sources of information with a single information monopoly confers an indeterminacy on the concepts of truth, fact, objectivity, and reality. From a pragmatist perspective, these words can then no longer mean exactly what they mean to speakers accustomed to freedom of discussion and inquiry. This corruption of discourse is detailed, e.g., in Arthur Koestler's Darkness at Noon, where criteria for belief?formation are ultimately completely divorced from the objects of belief. Like George Orwell, Koestler postulates a coherent totalitarian perspective, in which the objects of belief are no longer relevant to belief?formation. The present article argues that, once the connection between belief?formation and the object of belief is severed, one can no longer have a coherent body of belief. There is also no evidence that this connection was ever severed in the mind of Koestler's historical protagonist Bukharin, who thus differs from his counterpart Rubashov in Koestler's novel. On the other hand, Koestler's critics are at fault for exaggerating the contrast between Rubashov and the historical Bukharin. The latter's confession at the Moscow Trials can be best understood as a testimony to the epistemically and linguistically corruptive process detailed in Koestler's novel