Dialectica 65 (2):221-240 (2011)

Authors
David Hunter
Toronto Metropolitan University
Abstract
This paper argues that it is possible to knowingly believe something while judging that one ought not to believe it and (so) viewing the belief as manifesting a sort of failure. I offer examples showing that such ‘alienated belief’ has several potential sources. I contrast alienated belief with self-deception, incontinent (or akratic) belief and half-belief. I argue that the possibility of alienated belief is compatible with the so-called ‘transparency’ of first-person reflection on belief, and that the descriptive and expressive difficulties it involves stem from well-understood sources. I conclude by speculating that endorsed belief is in important respects like intentional action. Reflection on the possibility of alienated belief may thus help us to see one respect in which an agent can be responsible for her attitudes
Keywords No keywords specified (fix it)
Categories (categorize this paper)
DOI 10.1111/j.1746-8361.2011.01269.x
Options
Edit this record
Mark as duplicate
Export citation
Find it on Scholar
Request removal from index
Revision history

Download options

PhilArchive copy


Upload a copy of this paper     Check publisher's policy     Papers currently archived: 72,577
External links

Setup an account with your affiliations in order to access resources via your University's proxy server
Configure custom proxy (use this if your affiliation does not provide a proxy)
Through your library

References found in this work BETA

The Varieties of Reference.Gareth Evans - 1982 - Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Intention.G. E. M. Anscombe - 1957 - Harvard University Press.

View all 35 references / Add more references

Citations of this work BETA

The Normativity of Automaticity.Michael Brownstein & Alex Madva - 2012 - Mind and Language 27 (4):410-434.
Why We Can Still Believe the Error Theory.Marianna Bergamaschi Ganapini - 2016 - International Journal of Philosophical Studies 24 (4):523-536.
Inference as a Mental Act.David Hunter - forthcoming - In Michael Brent (ed.), Mental Action.

View all 18 citations / Add more citations

Similar books and articles

Incontinent Belief.Brian P. Mclaughlin - 1990 - Journal of Philosophical Research 15:115-126.
Why Believe?John Cottingham - 2009 - Continuum.
Why Responsible Belief is Blameless Belief.Anthony Booth & Rik Peels - 2010 - Journal of Philosophy 107 (5):257-265.
A Note on Jaakko Hintikka’s “Knowledge and Belief”.Paul Weingartner - 1994 - Grazer Philosophische Studien 49 (1):135-147.
Epistemic Circularity and Common Sense: A Reply to Reed.Michael Bergmann - 2006 - Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 73 (1):198-207.
Taking Aim at the Truth.Masahiro Yamada - 2012 - Philosophical Studies 157 (1):47-59.
The Ethics of Belief.Andrew Chignell - 2016 - Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy.
Does Belief (Only) Aim at the Truth?Daniel Whiting - 2012 - Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 93 (2):279-300.
Belief and Degrees of Belief.Franz Huber - 2009 - In F. Huber & C. Schmidt-Petri (eds.), Degrees of Belief. Springer.
'In Between Believing' and Degrees of Belief.Darrell P. Rowbottom - 2007 - Teorema: International Journal of Philosophy 26 (1):131-137.

Analytics

Added to PP index
2011-05-24

Total views
125 ( #96,023 of 2,533,614 )

Recent downloads (6 months)
3 ( #199,500 of 2,533,614 )

How can I increase my downloads?

Downloads

My notes