The Two tragedies argument

Journal of Medical Ethics 45 (5):304-308 (2019)
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Abstract

Opposition to induced abortion rests on the belief that fetuses have a moral status comparable to beings like us, and that the loss of such a life is tragic. Antiabortion, or pro-life, theorists argue that it is wrong to induce abortion and it is wrong to allow others to perform induced abortion. However, evidence suggests that spontaneous abortion kills far more fetuses than induced abortion, and critics argue that most pro-life theorists neglect the threat of spontaneous abortion and ought to do more to prevent it. Friberg-Fernros contends such an obligation would be implausibly strong, arguing that induced abortions are far worse than spontaneous abortions because while both involve the tragedy of the death of the fetus, induced abortion involves a second tragedy—one person killing another. I argue this two tragedies argument fails to explain what is morally relevant about induced abortion.

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References found in this work

Alternate Possibilities and Moral Responsibility.Harry G. Frankfurt - 1969 - Journal of Philosophy 66 (23):829-839.
A defense of abortion.Judith Jarvis Thomson - 1971 - Philosophy and Public Affairs 1 (1):47-66.
Why abortion is immoral.Don Marquis - 1989 - Journal of Philosophy 86 (4):183-202.
Active and passive euthanasia.James Rachels - 2000 - In Steven M. Cahn (ed.), Exploring Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology. New York, NY, United States of America: Oxford University Press USA.

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