Abstract

In this dissertation I have been concerned to conduct an analysis into the theoretical role played by the concept of intrinsic value as it has been invoked by various foundations for an Environmental Ethic. Within this analysis, I have distinguished between a metaphysical conception of intrinsic value, having to do with its ontological status, and a normative conception which abstracts from any questions pertaining to ontology and pertains solely to questions of normativity and moral obligation. I have noted a symmetry between certain earlier metaethical dialogues and the more recent debates concerning value's ontology in the domain of environmental value theory. I believe that the latter day Last Person thought experiment mirrors the challenge given by Sidgwick to which Moore responded with his Beautiful World analysis. Theorists have conflated a requirement for a noninstrumentalist value with the requirement for a strongly objectivist ontology for value. Hence, theorists believed that what was required was a nondispositionalist, internal notion of value... a value abstracted from any evaluative stance or even any possible evaluative stance. I show that this confusion is expressed in the present dialogue of environmental ethics. After assessing the role played by the notion of intrinsic value, I inquire into a coherent form of this notion and offer a revised theoretical framework or foundation for an environmental ethic by offering a revised account of its logical status